Can Housing Risk Be Diversified? A Cautionary Tale from the Housing Boom and Bust by Cotter, John et al.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507899 
Forthcoming, Review of Financial Studies 
 
CAN HOUSING RISK BE DIVERSIFIED? 
A CAUTIONARY TALE FROM THE HOUSING BOOM AND BUST 
 
 
John Cotter1, Stuart Gabriel2 and Richard Roll3  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study evaluates the effectiveness of geographic diversification in reducing housing investment 
risk.  To characterize diversification potential, we estimate spatial correlation and integration 
among 401 US metropolitan housing markets.  The 2000s boom brought a marked uptrend in 
housing market integration associated with eased residential lending standards and rapid growth 
in private mortgage securitization.  As boom turned to bust, macro factors, including employment 
and income fundamentals, contributed importantly to the trending up in housing return 
integration.  Portfolio simulations reveal substantially lower diversification potential and higher 
risk in the wake of increased market integration.        
 
This draft:  September 18 2014 
Keywords: integration, housing risk diversification, housing returns 
JEL Classification: G10, G11, G12, G14, R12, R21 
1UCD School of Business, University College Dublin, Blackrock, Co. Dublin, Ireland. Email: 
john.cotter@ucd.ie and Research Fellow, Ziman Center for Real Estate, UCLA Anderson School of 
Management.     
2Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los 
Angeles, California 90095, stuart.gabriel@anderson.ucla.edu 
3Caliornia Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, rroll@caltech.edu. 
 
The authors gratefully acknowledge research support from the UCLA Ziman Center for Real Estate.  
Cotter also acknowledges the support of Science Foundation Ireland under Grant Number 
08/SRC/FM1389.  The authors thank workshop participants at UCLA, the Red Rock Finance 
Conference, the 2013 EFA Annual Conference, the 2013 AREUEA International Meetings, the 2014 
Israel Real Estate and Urban Economics Symposium, Dublin City University, Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco, University College Dublin, Tel Aviv University, Xiamen University, and the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem as well as David Aboody, Tom Conlon, Jason Chang, Tom Davidoff, John 
Duca, Fernando Ferreira, Liam Gallagher, Mark Garmaise, Mark Grinblatt, Francis Longstaff, Stijn 
Van Nieuwerburgh, Steve Oliner, Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Chester Spatt, Avanidhar 
Subrahmanyam and Robert Shiller for helpful comments.  We are particularly grateful for the 
advice and suggestions from two anonymous referees and from Andrew Karolyi, the Executive 
Editor of this Journal. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507899 
 2 
I.    Introduction  
Geographic diversification long has been fundamental in risk mitigation among investors and 
insurers of housing, mortgages, and mortgage-related derivatives.  The housing government- 
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association, (Fannie Mae) and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, (Freddie Mac), now both in government 
conservatorship,  diversified geographically in an effort to reduce the risk of investment in a single 
asset class (residential mortgages.)  Similar logic was employed during the 2000s by prominent 
Wall Street firms, including Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Citigroup.  More recently, geographic 
diversification has become central to the investment strategies of multi-family real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) and single-family housing investment funds.1   
        During the late-2000s meltdown, anecdotal evidence suggests that geographic 
diversification was far from effective.2  Diversification has limited power when returns are highly 
correlated.  It seems likely that housing investors incurred substantial losses because of unforeseen 
and unprecedented contemporaneous price declines across geographically-distinct markets.   
The effectiveness of geographic diversification also has important implications for private 
and government-backed insurers of residential mortgages.  Substantial geographic correlation of 
credit losses, when coupled with sizable insurer guarantee liabilities and constrained access to 
credit markets, may render private mortgage insurance less viable.  In such circumstances, 
policymakers may turn to alternative mechanisms, such as deeply-subordinated government-
backed insurance on qualified mortgages, to assure liquidity and stability of the housing finance 
system.          
                                                             
1
 Freddie Mac’s efforts to geographically diversify mortgage assets held in portfolio are discussed in their 2007 
Annual Report, (p. 97).  The 10-Ks of large residential REITs such as Mid-American Apartment Communities and 
Apartment Investments and Management Company similarly address the expected benefits of portfolio geographic 
diversification.  Also, single-family housing hedge funds (e.g., Colony Capital) employ geographic diversification of 
single-family holdings as a strategy of risk mitigation. 
  
2
 For example, sizable losses were recorded in the geographically diversified retained portfolios of the failed housing 
GSEs.  As described by Michael Lewis (2010), the failure of diversified subprime mortgage-backed securities also 
figured importantly in the 2009 Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and Lehman insolvencies.   
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Despite the prevalence of geographic diversification by investors and insurers of mortgages 
and housing, only a few studies have explicitly examined such strategies.  Nadauld, Sherlund and 
Vorkink (2011) and Nadauld and Sherlund (2009), for example, examine loan collateral 
diversification in the context of sub-prime mortgage-backed securitization.   
While those studies offer important insights, little is known about geographic diversification 
in housing in general and whether it changed over the recent boom and bust cycles.  Indeed, while 
the finance literature has addressed issues of correlation and integration among global equity 
markets, little attention has been paid to the same issues among real estate markets.  A few studies 
include assessment of integration among securitized real estate markets (see, for example, Liow 
(2010)) or between securitized real estate and equity markets (Lin and Lin, 2011).  However, we 
are unaware of prior analysis of the magnitude or trend in metropolitan housing market 
integration, as evidenced by the relative exposure of housing returns to fluctuations in national 
economic, housing market, and housing finance factors.  Further, little is known about the relative 
importance of macro and financial drivers of housing market integration and their variation over 
time or across geographies.  Few studies have explicitly estimated temporal variation in risk 
associated with diversified housing investment portfolios.3   
Measures of housing market integration and housing portfolio risk are important indicators 
of diversification benefits.  Such indicators are relevant to the full spectrum of market participants, 
be they housing and housing derivative investors, homebuilders, and the like.  They also provide 
policymakers with information about the temporal and geographic diffusion of macroeconomic 
shocks and national economic policy.   Measures of housing market integration across metropolitan 
                                                             
3
 However, the literature includes related analyses of real estate investment trusts (REITs) using equity factors such 
as those developed by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Fama and French (1993).  Such studies include Chan, 
Hendershott and Sanders (1990) and Karolyi and Sanders (1998) who find, inter alia, that changes in expected 
inflation influence REIT returns.  Explanations of REIT returns by the Fama-French (1993) factors are reported in 
Peterson and Hsieh (1997); whereas this approach has been expanded to include a momentum factor (Hung and 
Glascock (2010)) and the influence of liquidity (Cannon and Cole (2011).   
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regions of the U.S. are vital as policymakers seek to re-structure the housing finance system and 
mitigate catastrophic risk associated with severe housing downturns.   
Our study commences with an assessment of spatial correlation in housing returns.  This 
includes an examination of contemporaneous and lagged return correlations among metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs.)  High levels of MSA return correlation raise concerns for mortgage or 
housing investors seeking to diversify risk associated with investment in this asset class.    We find 
large numbers of MSA pairs with contemporaneous and lagged housing return correlations at high 
levels of statistical significance.  Large MSA housing return correlations appear to be especially 
pronounced in California.  In that state, 98 percent of MSA paired returns are significantly 
correlated with a mean correlation level of about 77 percent. 
Given evidence of high levels of spatial correlation in returns, we turn to an assessment of 
the integration of housing markets.  Our measure of integration is based on the proportion of a 
MSAs housing market returns that can be explained by an identical set of national factors (see 
Pukthuanthong-Le and Roll (2009)).  The level of integration is indicated by the magnitude of R-
square, with higher values representing higher levels of integration.  Two MSAs are viewed as 
perfectly integrated if the same national factors fully explain housing market returns in both areas.   
In that case, the R-square would be 1.0, implying no diversification potential between the MSAs.   
We estimate housing market integration and drivers thereof over time and across markets. 
In so doing, we compute temporal variation in factor contribution to integration R-square as well as 
factor statistical and economic significance for quarterly time-series between 1992 and 2012.  Also, 
we evaluate geographic variation in integration factor estimates.  Results of the integration analysis 
are then employed to construct alternative metropolitan housing investment portfolios and to 
assess portfolio risks over the recent period of housing boom, bust, and beyond.   
Findings reveal a pronounced trending up in US housing market integration over the period 
of boom and bust.  Prior to the 2000s boom, integration held roughly steady at around 45 percent 
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over the 1992 – 2004 period.  However, starting in late 2004, average integration levels turned up 
and peaked at 67 percent in 2010.  During 2011 and 2012, as the crisis abated, housing return 
integration trended back down to about 55 percent.   Among California MSAs, integration is 
generally higher but the recent movements are similar, rising from about 63 percent in 2004 to 
around 90 percent late in the decade.  By 2012, integration within California housing returns had 
declined to just over 80 percent.   These recent movements in housing integration are robust to 
variations in MSA cohorts and estimation methods.  
We are able to identify factors associated with the increased integration during the latter 
half of the 2000s.  To do so, we compute the contribution to integration R-square associated with 
each factor.  Innovations in mortgage finance, notably including securitization of non-conforming 
mortgages and ease of mortgage underwriting, were strongly associated with higher integration 
during the 2004 -2007 boom period.  Estimated economic significance associated with those factors 
moved up substantially during the boom period.  Also, while the t-statistics associated with those 
factor loadings tended to move together across US Census Bureau census divisions, they were most 
pronounced in California.  These results coincide with arguments in the literature (see, for example, 
Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2013), Garriga, Manuelli, and Peralta-Alva, (2012), 
Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2012) and Mian and Sufi (2009)) that the boom in house prices was 
fueled in no small measure by widespread easing in mortgage qualification and in the provision of 
non-conforming secondary market liquidity.    
As boom turned to bust and the influence of mortgage liberalization waned, other macro 
factors, including employment and income fundamentals, contributed importantly to the ongoing 
trending up in housing return integration.  Indeed, those factors were responsible for the majority 
of the increment in U.S. housing market integration during the post-boom period.  Similarly, the 
estimated exposure to and economic significance of those macro fundamentals was heightened 
during the crisis period.  More recently, and in the wake of the attenuation of the crisis, those same 
 6 
macro factors accounted for much of the downward adjustment in metro return integration.  
California MSAs tell a roughly similar story albeit with a markedly higher level of housing return 
integration.           
Equal-weighted portfolios of the longest-available U.S. and California metropolitan housing 
cohorts show sharply rising levels of portfolio risk over the 2000s housing boom and bust.  Changes 
in U.S. portfolio risk correlate strongly with the level of housing market integration.  During the 
2000s housing boom and bust, the simple correlation between the integration R-square and the 
standard deviation of portfolio returns is 0.96!  During the crisis period, housing portfolio 
diversification provided only limited benefits in risk diversification.  Indeed, the negative 
correlation between portfolio integration and diversification benefits averaged over -0.82 during 
the period of housing boom and bust.  This combination seems to have left investors and insurers of 
housing credit risk rather exposed to the market downturn.  Taken together, our findings offer a 
cautionary tale about geographic diversification as a mechanism to mitigate housing risk. 
II. MSA Return Correlations 
  We study 401 metropolitan housing price indices from the U.S. Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) that have been examined by others; (for example, see Clark and Coggin 
(2009); and Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles (2008)).  The FHFA series are weighted repeat-sale 
price indices associated with single-family homes.  Home sales and refinancings included in the 
FHFA sample are associated with purchase mortgage loans conforming to the underwriting 
requirements of the housing GSEs—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The restriction to GSE-
conforming mortgages may reduce housing price volatility.  Nevertheless, the FHFA data comprise 
the most extensive cross-sectional and time-series of quality-adjusted house price indices publically 
available in the United States.4   There were only 214 MSAs in the database at the beginning of the 
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sample, (1985Q1) but the number increased rapidly, reaching 347 at the end of 1989 and the 
current number, 401, in the second quarter of 2005. 
There is a general uptrend from 1985 through the first half of the 2000s in the national 
average of the metropolitan area house price indexes.   But, as is well-known, the latter half of the 
2000s saw a marked boom and then a sharp bust pattern.  The California pattern is similar though 
the up- and down-swings are much more pronounced.   Figure A-1 in Internet Appendix A plots the 
unweighted average index over the entire US and the corresponding average index for 29 California 
MSAs.   
Housing returns for each MSA are computed quarterly from first differences of the 
logarithm of index levels5.  Return correlations are then computed between all MSA return pairs 
(total sample N = 80,200 distinct pairs; i.e., 401(400)/2).  The mean contemporaneous correlation 
of all MSAs return pairs is 0.29, with a considerable cross coefficient standard deviation of 0.19.   
However, assuming independence across the correlations, the t-statistic associated with the mean 
of 0.29 is over 428, indicating a highly significant average correlation among MSA returns.   Further 
evidence of strong correlation is the fact that 52,806 pairs have t-statistics for individual pairwise 
correlations exceeding 2.0, with a mean correlation of 0.394; 35,460 pairs have t-statistics 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 The HPI is a broad measure of the movement of single-family house prices. The HPI is a weighted, repeat-
sales index that measures average price changes in repeat sales or refinancings on the same properties. This 
information is obtained by reviewing repeat mortgage transactions on single-family properties whose 
mortgages have been purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since the inception of the index 
in January 1975. The HPI is updated each quarter as additional mortgages are purchased or securitized by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The new mortgage acquisitions are used to identify repeat transactions for the 
most recent quarter and for each quarter since the first quarter of 1975.  In contrast to the value-weighted 
Case-Shiller US house price index, FHFA’s index includes data from a comprehensive set of metropolitan 
housing markets in the U.S. and weights price trends equally for all properties. For a full discussion of the 
FHFA house price index, see Calhoun (1996) and for a critique of the series in the context of alternative house 
price series see Nagaraja, Browny, and Wachter (2010). 
 
5 In principle, it would be desirable to model house prices at higher frequencies.  Unfortunately, monthly 
quality-adjusted house price indices are available from FHFA only for Census Divisions (N=18) and only for a 
much shorter time frame. 
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exceeding 3.0, with mean correlation, 0.462.  More details about the distribution of inter-MSA 
correlations are reported in Table A-1 of Internet Appendix A. 
Table 1 reports contemporaneous and leading MSA house return correlation coefficients 
computed over the entire sample, 1985-2012, and averaged by US Census Bureau census divisions.  
Given its more pronounced boom and bust, California is reported separately from other states in 
the Pacific census division.  (The remaining Pacific census division states are Oregon, Washington, 
Alaska, and Hawaii.6)  The left panel of Table 1 reveals that house return correlations vary 
substantially across US census divisions.   Over the entire 27 years of available data, the first eight 
census divisions had housing returns mean correlations in the range of roughly 0.2 to 0.4, with not 
more than 40 percent highly significant.   This would imply adequate potential for geographic 
diversification.   But New England and California offer distinctly less potential.   California in 
particular would be problematic because 98 percent of its MSA pairs are significantly 
contemporaneously correlated and the mean correlation is about 0.77.      
As reported in the right panel of table 1, average one-quarter lagged plus leading 
correlations are low in the first eight census divisions, with fewer than 30 percent being statistically 
significant.  In marked contrast, MSAs in New England and California are characterized by relatively 
high percentages of significant and elevated lagged correlations.  California is again the outlier; over 
90 percent of its MSAs record significant lagged and leading return correlations, with a mean 
correlation of 0.67.7 
 
  
                                                             
6
 This partition of the Pacific division is maintained in all division-level exhibits in the paper.  
7
 In unreported work, we examined MSA extreme or “jump” movements in housing returns.  Jumps were computed 
using the Lee and Mykland (2008) measure.  Results indicate substantially higher levels of extreme house returns 
during the late 2000s housing boom and bust, especially in California.  Further, contemporaneous and lead 
correlations in housing extreme returns were highly pronounced among California MSAs.       
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III. Integration  
Substantial research has studied the integration of international equity markets (for a 
comprehensive review of this topic and related research see Gagnon and Karolyi (2006)).  The 
dynamics of equity market integration has been investigated by Harvey (1991), Chan, Karolyi, and 
Stulz (1992), Engle and Susmel (1993), Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Longin and Solnik (1995), and 
Errunza, Hogan, and Hung (2007). Papers have tended to vary in geographic focus, as some address 
integration in the European community (see, for example, Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulos, and 
Priestley (2006), and Schotman and Zalewska (2006)), whereas others investigate emerging 
markets (see, for example, Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Chambet and Gibson (2008), Bekaert, 
Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2011)).  Some employ the US as a benchmark market (Ammer and 
Mei (1995) and Karolyi and Stulz (1996)).  
There is also considerable variation in methods.  For instance, Carrieri, Errunza and Hogan 
(2007) use GARCH-in-mean to assess correlation in returns and volatility among markets, while 
Longin and Solnik (1995) use cointegration.  As in our paper, Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) use 
multiple economic fundamental factors.  Integration is often described in terms of cross-country 
correlations in stock returns (for an early study see King and Wadhwani (1990)); however, 
correlation may be a misleading measure.   
When multiple factors drive returns, markets may be imperfectly correlated but perfectly 
integrated.   As shown by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009), while perfect integration implies that 
identical global factors fully explain index returns across countries, some countries may differ in 
their sensitivities to those factors and accordingly not exhibit perfect correlation.8  
                                                             
8 For a straightforward intuitive example of such, consider an energy-exporting country such as Saudi Arabia 
and an energy-importing country such as Hong Kong.   Both countries might be positively associated with 
global factors such as consumer goods or financial services.  Moreover, both countries could be fully 
integrated in the global economy. Yet the simple correlation between their stock market returns could be 
relatively small, or even negative, because higher energy price increase Saudi equity values and decrease 
Hong Kong equity values.  As a consequence, the extent to which the multi-factors drive returns is a better 
indication of likely diversification benefits than a correlation measure.   
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Pukthuanthong-Le and Roll (2009) provide a simple intuitive measure of financial market 
integration based on the proportion of a country’s returns that can be explained by an identical set 
of global factors.  This measure of integration implicitly regards country-specific residual variance 
in a factor model as an indicator of imperfect integration.9  Clearly, to the extent global factors 
explain only a small proportion of variance in a country’s returns, the country would be viewed as 
less integrated (see, for example, Stulz (1981) and Errunza and Losq (1985)).10  In contrast, 
markets would be viewed as highly integrated to the extent their returns are well explained.   
We extend this idea to US housing markets.  Those markets should be regarded as highly 
integrated if identical US national factors explain a large portion of the variance in MSA-specific 
housing returns.  Hence to measure US housing market integration, we employ the explained 
variance (r-square) from a regression of metropolitan housing returns on an identical set of 
national economic, financial, and housing market fundamentals.  
a. Model Data and Specification  
For each MSA in the sample, the housing return is regressed on a common set of national 
economic, housing, and financial market factors.  These factors were previously employed in 
explaining housing returns by Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks 
(2006), Ortalo-Magne, and Rady (2006), Hua, and Craig.  (2011), Gerdesmeier, Lenarcic and Roffia 
(2012) and Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2006).  
Also included are factors representing mortgage underwriting and secondary market 
liquidity.  These are suggested by many researchers and analysts who argue that the 2000s housing 
boom was abetted, if not fueled entirely, by a marked  easing of mortgage qualification and near-
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
9 In contrast, in the presence of multiple national factors, the simple correlation between MSA housing return 
indexes could be a flawed measure of integration unless those MSAs have identical exposure to the national 
factors, e.g., unless the estimated coefficient vectors are exactly proportional across MSAs.  
 
10 According to this definition, a country is perfectly integrated if the country-specific variance is zero after 
controlling for global factors.  In the case of two perfectly integrated countries, market indexes would have 
zero residual variance.  See Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) for discussion and details. 
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ubiquitous expansion in non-conforming loan securitization; (for example, see Favilukis, Ludvigson, 
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2013), Garriga, Manuelli, and Peralta-Alva, (2012), Duca, Muellbauer, and 
Murphy (2012) and Mian and Sufi (2009)).  As boom turned to bust and liquidity waned, more 
stringent underwriting, including income and employment information,, became important for 
mortgage qualification and housing demand.  
The explanatory factors include average borrower loan-to-value ratio (LTV), private 
residential mortgage-backed securities issuance (PRIVMBS), payroll employment (PAYEMS), equity 
markets (S&P500), industrial production (INDPRO), PPI materials prices, (PPITM)  personal income 
(INCOME), consumer sentiment (UMCSENT), single-family building permits (PERMIT1), and the 
Federal Funds rate (FEDFUNDS).  All explanatory factor data are quarterly over 1985:Q1 – 2012:Q4.  
Further details are provided by Tables A-2 and A-3 in Internet Appendix A, which provide summary 
statistics and their respective correlations. Data for the factors are obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) with the exception of the S&P500 
(Datastream), private MBS issuance (Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts), LTV (FHFA), and 
personal income (US Bureau of Economic Analysis).11  The log first differences of all these variables 
were used in the factor model to explain housing returns. 
Integration is measured by the R-square from the multi-factor model fit to a sequence of 30-
quarter moving windows for each MSA.12  There are 112 quarters available for the MSA and factor 
data beginning in 1985:Q1, so the first 30-quarter window spans 1985:Q1 through 1992:Q2.  There 
are 83 30-quarter windows in all.   
The equal-weighted R-square averaged over all available MSAs portrays the mean level of 
integration during the period spanned by each moving window.  Changes in this average MSA R-
                                                             
11
 We looked at factors both individually and in combination in their explanation of housing returns.  That 
assessment was based on their relative contribution to the level of integration over time.  Also, we tested for the 
effects of other factors, such as changes in the industrial organization of the real estate industry, as reflected in a 
Herfindahl index of homebuilder concentration.  That term yielded only limited increment to regression explanatory 
power and was not quantitatively important to the trend in integration R-square displayed in Figure 1. 
    
12
Note there is no evidence of serial correlation in the regressions residuals.  
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square from one window to the next track the evolution of integration on average for the U.S.  The 
contribution of individual common factors to integration is quantified by their separate influences 
on the average R-square.  
b.       Return Regressions on National Factors 
The US housing market has become more integrated since 2004, (Figure 1.)    Figure 1 plots 
the average R-square over the 1992:Q2 – 2012:Q4 period for the national and California samples.  
On the national level, integration held roughly steady around 45 percent over the 1992 – 2004 
period.  The boom and bust period in housing was characterized by a strong uptrend in MSA market 
integration to roughly 66 percent by end of decade.  More recently, integration levels eased back to 
about 55 percent in late 2012.      
In California, metropolitan housing market integration trended up from around 63 percent 
in 2004 to a 90 percent at decade’s end.  While California integration eased to about 80 percent by 
2012, it remained highly integrated.   
To control for the possibility that newly introduced MSAs differ in their degree of 
integration (smaller cities were added later), we examined the trends in R-square for three 
separate cohorts.  A similar procedure is followed by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) and 
Pukthuanthong-Le and Roll (2009) to deal with the timing of inclusion of individual stocks in 
market indices.  The cohorts include cities that were in the database continually from 1985:Q1 
through 2012:Q4 (cohort 1), cities added from 1989:Q1 through 2012:Q4 (cohort 2), and those 
added from 1992:Q3 through 2012:Q4 (cohort 3).13  Internet Appendix A plots the resulting trends.  
Panel A of Figure A-2 shows that the cohorts all display a similar pattern, a marked upward trend in 
housing market integration over the 2000s boom and bust followed by some fall off in recent years. 
We also assess the robustness of housing integration results to window length.  While 
longer windows provide additional degrees of freedom, they also result in shorter integration time-
                                                             
 
13
 The 3 cohorts are chosen such that the final integration series yields values starting in 2000:Q1. 
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series.  We checked this with window lengths of 30, 40, and 50 quarters.  Regardless of window 
length average integration hovers in the 30 to 40 percent range over the first half of the 2000s but 
displays a marked uptrend in integration over the latter half of the decade.  Also, while the 30 and 
40 quarter moving window series show a decline in average US housing market integration in 2011 
and 2012, integration levels remain well above of those for the pre-boom years of the 2000s.14    
MSA housing market cross-sectional and time-series summary statistics for the full US 
sample and for California are reported in Table 2.   The table reports mean quarterly housing 
returns, standard deviations of returns (sigma), mean first and last R-square measures for each of 
the integration time-series regressions, the change in R-square over the full sample and over the 
2000-2012 period, and the associated R-square time trend t-statistics (R-squares for each MSA are 
fit to a simple linear time trend for all available quarters).   For the entire U.S., summary cross-
sectional statistics are presented for quintiles, minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviations 
of all return and integration characteristics. 15  To save space, fewer cross-MSA statistics are 
reported in Panel B for California.   
First, for the entire U.S., note from the first two columns of Panel A that risks and returns 
associated with housing have been substantial.  The average quarterly return for all MSA housing 
markets is 0.794% with an average standard deviation of 2.088%.  Moreover, there is substantial 
cross-MSA variation; for example, mean housing return varies from a minimum 0.165% to a sample 
maximum of 1.412%.   
The mean final period R-square of the integration model is .556, revealing the importance of 
national influences on MSA housing returns.  On average, R-squares increase about 11 percent from 
the beginning to end of sample.  In some areas, however, national economic and housing market 
fundamentals fail to explain much of the variation in MSA-specific housing returns (e.g., the 
                                                             
14
 Panel B of Figure A-2 in Internet Appendix A plots average house price integration for the US national 
sample across window lengths of 30, 40 and 50 quarters. 
15 Integration results for each of the 401 MSAs are available from the authors upon request.     
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minimum 2000 R-square is 0.089).  At the other extreme, those same fundamentals explain 92.5 
percent of MSA-specific housing returns at the start of the millennium.  There is also substantial 
variation in the change in R-square across the sample with a standard deviation of 0.235. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports much of the same information for the 29 California MSAs 
included in our dataset.  In comparison to the full national sample of 401 MSAs, California housing 
markets are characterized by elevated returns, return volatility, and housing market integration.  
For instance, the mean final period R-square for the California MSAs is 81.9 percent, well in excess 
of the 55.9 percent average over the nation as a whole.  This implies that national factors are more 
important for housing returns in California than in other regions.  However, within California there 
is substantial temporal and cross-MSA variation in integration.    
The average integration R-square in California moved up over the 2000-2012 period by 
15.1 percent and the integration trend was highly statistically significant.  Elevated integration 
levels in the latter half of the 2000s may have limited investor ability to diversify housing risk 
geographically across housing markets.  
c. Integration Drivers 
In this section, we seek to identify the drivers of the significant upward movement in 
housing market integration estimated for the latter half of the 2000s.  To do so, we compute the 
contribution to integration R-square of each factor in the model.  We also assess factor statistical 
and economic significance (using a bootstrap procedure to be described below) for all factors and 
all moving windows.   
Further, we investigate variation in factor significance across U.S. census divisions.  Our 
objective is to assess the role of economic fundamentals relative to innovations in mortgage finance, 
particularly those associated with mortgage underwriting and securitization, in their respective 
contributions to integration trends.  As already mentioned, lengthy discussions by policymakers, 
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academics, and journalists have pointed to the salience of such influences in the recent house price 
boom and bust.  
As a caveat before beginning, however, we would be the first to admit that the factors 
associated here with housing returns are not necessarily comprehensive, exclusive or even 
exogenous.  It is clearly possible that some unknown omitted variables caused co-movement in 
house prices and mortgage underwriting standards.  The explanatory factors may indeed be 
proxying for other underlying influences that are thus far unidentified.  Thus, we hesitate to claim 
that the estimated coefficients of the factors indicate marginal causative impacts.  However, 
bootstrap results (below), show that estimated factor betas are mostly well-estimated.  Finally, 
even if the factors are mere proxies, the integration measure (R-square) should still be meaningful; 
substituting the true underlying variables, if any, for the factor proxies would likely produce a 
similar level of measured integration.  Moreover, direct portfolio risk assessment (as in section IV 
below) is immune to this issue and provides very similar inferences. 
As shown in figure 1, US and California housing market integration trended up throughout 
the period of housing boom and bust.   The average US (California) integration R-square moved 38 
(65) percent in 2004 to about 53 (85) percent in early 2008.   As boom turned to bust, integration 
continued to increase, reaching about 66 (90) percent in 2009.  Subsequently, as the crisis abated, 
US housing market integration began to ease down.   
To examine the contribution of each factor to integration R-square, we start with a single-
factor model and then incrementally add an additional factor and re-estimate the model.  We 
continue this procedure until all factors are included in the model.  In figure 2, we plot the 
incremental R-square associated with each regression.  For example, the plot labelled LTV shows 
the R-square from a single factor model that has only the loan to value ratio (LTV) as the 
explanatory variable.  We then augment the model to include private mortgage-backed securities 
issuance (PRIVMBS); the plot labelled PRIVMBS shows the R-square from this two-factor model 
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that includes LTV and PRIVMBS.  Note that the difference in R-square between the two-factor and 
single-factor models shows the incremental explanatory power associated with the PRIVMBS 
factor.  The final model, labelled FEDFUNDs (for the Federal Funds interest rate), includes all 10 
factors up to and including FEDFUNDs.  This last model is identical to the housing integration trend 
shown in Figure 1.  Results of this exercise are robust to the order in which the factors are entered 
into the model.   
As shown in Figure 2, the uptrend in R-square during the 2004 to early 2008 boom period is 
explained by increased power of several factors notably including private mortgage securitizations 
(PRIVMBS) and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV).  This corroborates findings cited already (see, for 
example, Favilukis,  Ludvigson, Van Nieuwerburgh (2013), Garriga, Manuelli, and Peralta-Alva, 
(2012) Duca, Muellbauer and Murphy (2012) and Mian and Sufi (2009)) suggesting that the boom 
in house prices was fueled in no small measure by ease of mortgage underwriting and availability of 
non-conforming secondary market liquidity.  As further shown in figure 2, subsequent trending up 
in integration during the bust period reflects the increased importance of economic fundamentals, 
particularly personal income (INCOME) which was responsible for virtually all of the increment to 
U.S. housing market integration during the crisis period.  Income also accounts for much of the 
downward adjustment in integration as the crisis waned.  This is true for California as well (Panel B 
of Figure 2) but for that region LTV played a more influential and time-varying role. 
To help estimate factor statistical and economic significance, we use a bootstrap procedure.  
Five hundred bootstrap re-samplings are conducted for each 30-quarter period, the first ending in 
Quarter 2, 1992 and the last ending in Quarter 4, 2012.   During each 30-quarter interval, there are 
between 214 and 401 MSAs available with complete data.  The number of MSAs increases over time 
as more metropolitan areas enter the data base.16  The bootstrap procedure re-samples both MSAs 
                                                             
16
 The maximum number of MSAs prevails after Quarter 3 of 2008 (i.e., for the last 50 samples) and there are at 
least 300 MSAs after Quarter 3 of 1994 (i.e., only the first nine samples have fewer than 300 MSAs.) 
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and quarters within each sample.17  Since both the MSAs and time periods are chosen randomly in 
each replication, the 500 regression results are independent.  Hence, the cross-replication standard 
deviation of each coefficient, divided by the square root of the number of MSAs present in that 
sample period, is an unbiased estimate of the standard error of the mean coefficient estimate.  
Estimates from the bootstrap are very closely related to the regression coefficients 
estimated from the original data.  For example, the bootstrap t-values for factor loadings, (bootstrap 
means divided by bootstrap standard errors,) are highly correlated with the t-values obtained from 
the data; these correlations range from a low of .915 to a high of .987 across the ten explanatory 
factors and nine of ten have correlations above .95.  
The bootstrapped factor betas also provide insight regarding drivers of MSA housing return 
integration.  As suggested above, the boom period was characterized by eased mortgage 
underwriting and enhanced secondary market non-conforming liquidity provision, both of which 
allowed substantial numbers of previously unqualified households to obtain mortgage credit.    
For both housing finance factors, PRIVMBS and LTV, we see a strong relationship between 
the pattern in levels of integration and factor significance.  In the early part of the sample, these 
factors have relatively low statistical power as the level of integration remained relatively steady. In 
contrast, during the rise and subsequent fall of integration during the boom and bust, both 
PRIVMBS and LTV’s statistical influence increased substantially along with the trend in integration 
levels.  From 2004-2008, the t-statistics for factor loadings of PRIVMBS start increasing and become 
                                                             
17
 For example, suppose that there are 400 MSAs with full data in a given sample period.  First, a random number 
between 1 and 400 is chosen.  Suppose this number is 175, which fixes the 30 quarterly returns for the MSA that is 
ranked 175 alphabetically during that sample period.  Next, a random number is drawn between 1 and 30.   This 
determines a calendar quarter for the 175th MSA's real estate return and the concurrent factor movements; these 
values become regression observation #1.  Then, another random number between 1 and 30 is drawn (with 
replacement) to determine a second calendar quarter that becomes regression observation #2.  This is repeated a total 
of 30 times, with replacement.  Then, a regression is estimated with the 30 randomly chosen real estate returns (for 
the 175th MSA) as dependent variable and the randomly chosen (but contemporaneous) factor movements as 
explanatory variables.  Next, a second MSA is chosen randomly with replacement and the process repeated to get a 
second set of regression estimates.  This was repeated 500 times.  Since each sample periods overlaps by 29 quarters 
with the next one, period-by-period sample averages not independent, though a case could be made that the 
bootstrap results ARE independent, despite the overlap in the original data, because the resampling is randomized.   
 
 18 
in general highly significant. As boom turns to bust and the levels of integration begin to fall, there 
is a change in direction, and eventually, sign of the PRIVMBS factor loading.  A similar pattern 
occurs for the LTV factor, although its statistical influence remains positive in the more recent 
period.   
As we saw in Figure 2, among economic fundamentals, income contributes importantly to 
the level of integration.   When the level of integration started rising from 2004, income became the 
dominant factor.  The bootstrap verifies that income factor loadings are positive and significant 
during the upturn in integration trends while they turn significantly negative as integration 
declines.  Analogously, the other economic fundamental factor identified as contributing 
substantially to integration, payroll employment, (PAYEMS), has a similar pattern increasing to 
significance during the boom period and subsequently declining.  
Another question of interest is whether the impact of factors is universal across MSAs.  To 
examine this issue, we exploit the geographical disaggregation used earlier into census divisions.  
Statistical influence for explanatory factors varies to some extent across census divisions but the 
time pattern of their influence is similar.  Plots of bootstrap t-statistics for the most important 
variables are provided by census division in Internet Appendix A, Figure A-3.   
 The corresponding bootstrapped factor economic significance is displayed in figure 3.   
Each factor was first normalized to mean zero and unit variance during each replication of the 
bootstrap regressions.  Hence, the economic impact can also be read on the same vertical scale 
along with statistical significance.  The economic impact is in units of percent per quarter of metro 
housing returns so that the coefficients represent the impact of a one standard deviation change in 
the factor on the quarterly percent return.  The minimum and maximum of the vertical scale are, 
respectively, -4% per quarter and +3% per quarter and is sufficient so that all variables can be 
judged relative to each other.  
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Figure 3 reveals that the estimated economic impact of PRIVMBS moves up sharply over the 
boom period.  Its coefficient is precisely estimated and of substantial magnitude, suggesting that by 
2008, a 1 standard deviation change in log private MBS issuance was associated, on average, with 
more than a 2 percent increase in quarterly housing returns.  The economic significance of 
mortgage underwriting, defined as log conforming loan-to-value ratio (LTV) for all borrowers, also 
trended up some between 2004 – 2007.  The coefficient also is precisely estimated, suggesting in 
2007 that a 1 standard deviation change in log conforming LTV was associated, on average, with 
about a 1 percent increase in quarterly housing returns.  Indeed, results here are consistent with 
findings of other recent studies in suggesting that mortgage underwriting and liquidity, the latter in 
the form of enhanced provision of non-conforming secondary market finance, were important to 
the house price run-up of the boom period.  As further indicated by Figure 3, the economic 
significance of both the LTV and private mortgage securitizations factors sharply declined in recent 
years.   
As suggested above, as housing boom turned bust and in the wake of the waning of 
mortgage supply factors, economic fundamentals took on more significance in explanation of 
average metropolitan housing returns.  Indeed, the ongoing rise in return integration during the 
2008 – 2010 owed largely to the elevated importance of the income factor.  Indeed, MSA housing 
return integration continued to trend up even as house price indices were moving in the opposite 
direction.  As shown in figure 3, the economic significance of payroll employment trended up 
markedly during the latter half of the 2000s.  By decade’s end, a 1 standard deviation in log percent 
change in payroll employment was associated with a 2 percent increase in quarterly MSA average 
housing returns.  Log personal income had an even more sizable effect.  Further, the estimated 
coefficient on the income term turned sharply negative during the final years of the decade, 
reflecting ongoing downward adjustments in house prices even as economy-wide income 
fundamentals began to improve. 
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IV. MSA Return Integration and Portfolio Risk Diversification   
Finally, we assess the relations among portfolio diversification, integration, and risk for U.S. 
metropolitan housing markets.  As noted in the introduction, geographic diversification long has 
been a key strategy for risk mitigation by investors and insurers of housing, mortgages, and 
mortgage-related derivatives.  For example, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation, sought to geographically diversify its single-family loan portfolio to reduce credit 
risks. 18   During the 2000s boom years, Wall Street investment banks employed similar 
diversification strategies in assembly of mortgage-backed securities and related derivatives.  More 
recently, newly-formed single-family housing investment funds and large, multifamily real estate 
investment trusts also have employed geographic diversification to mitigate portfolio risk.19, 20 
To capture diversified risks of housing, we examine equal-weighted portfolios of the longest 
available U.S. and California housing cohorts (1992:Q2 – 2012:Q4).   Housing return volatility 
(standard deviation) is computed for each MSA using a 30-quarter moving window.  Diversification 
is measured by the difference between average MSA volatility and portfolio volatility.   
In Figure 4, panels A and B, we provide evidence of integration and diversification for the U.S. 
and California metropolitan areas.  Particularly evident are the strong opposite movements during 
the housing boom years of the 2000s.21  For the U.S. as a whole, average integration moved up from 
about 40 percent at the start of decade to approximately 65 percent by the decade’s end.  Over that 
                                                             
18
 See Freddie Mac Annual Report, 2007 (p. 97). 
 
19
 Colony Capital, for example, has sought to reduce risk via geographic diversification of the holdings of its single-
family housing hedge fund. 
 
20
 See, for example, explicit statements on the intended benefits of geographic diversification that appear in the 10-
Ks of large residential REITs including Mid-America Apartment Communities and Apartment Investment and 
Management Company (AIV). 
 
21
 In unreported work, we find that the relation between correlated jumps and diversification is similar; increased 
incidence of correlated jumps results in lower diversification possibilities. So when markets experience large and 
negative correlated price movements, the ability to diversify away this risk is reduced substantially, and at precisely 
the time when this mitigating effect is most desirable. 
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decade, risk mitigation associated with housing portfolio diversification fell by more than one-half.   
As reported in table 3 panel A, the simple correlation coefficient between integration (R-square) 
and diversification was -.966 during the decade of the 2000s.  But it was negative and large in 
absolute value during other periods as well, periods when neither measure moved as much.  
When housing regions are well integrated, geographic diversification benefits are meagre.  In 
more recent years and in the wake of attenuation of the crisis, diversification opportunities 
improved a bit while the simple correlation between integration and diversification became less 
pronounced.22          
A qualitatively similar pattern is observed for California MSAs in panel B of figure 3e, but 
the levels are different because this region is more integrated with national influences.  During the 
2002s, California’s average housing return integration increase from 67 to 90 percent while its 
diversification fell precipitously and ended at a paltry 5 percent of the maximum.23 
As reported table 3, California’s housing market integration and portfolio diversification 
exhibit strong negative correlation, thereby mimicking the country as a whole.  The simple 
correlation coefficient between those series was -.862 for the full 1992 – 2012 timeframe and -.836 
for the decade of the 2000s although it fell to some extent during the boom and bust.   
In sum, analysis of simulated investment portfolios indicates sizable upward adjustment to 
measured risk in the context of the pronounced increase in portfolio integration over the 2000s 
housing boom and bust.  The increases in portfolio risk reflect sharp declines in opportunities for 
investment diversification.  While integration slowed in 2011 and 2012, our findings still suggest 
substantial limitations to geographic diversification as a strategy for portfolio risk mitigation.      
  
                                                             
22
 The equal-weighted portfolio results for the US are robust to the exclusion of California MSAs.   
23
The theoretical maximum would be the elimination of all individual risk at the portfolio level.   
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V. Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of geographic diversification for risk mitigation among 
investors and insurers of housing.  Using data from 401 US MSAs, it computes spatial correlation 
and return integration among US housing markets over the last three decades.  To provide insight 
about the drivers of housing integration, it estimates national factor contributions to integration 
along with their statistical and economic significance.  
Our national multi-factor model reveals a marked trending up in housing market integration 
during the 2000s.  Among California MSAs, integration reached 90 percent of the possible 
maximum.  Portfolio simulations reveal reduced diversification potential and higher risk in the 
wake of increased market integration. 
Factors associated with the mid-2000s housing market boom and trending up in integration 
include eased residential lending standards and a growth in private mortgage securitizations.  As 
boom turned to bust, macro factors including employment and income fundamentals contributed 
largely to the ongoing rise in housing return integration.  The degree of national factor significance 
largely moved in tandem across US regions.          
Our findings shed new light on the poor performance of geographically-disparate housing and 
residential MBS investments during the late 2000s.  The results suggest that losses to private and 
government-backed mortgage insurers could possibly reach unsustainable levels in a severe 
housing downturn.  While various proposals are now being debated, a possible future structure of 
the housing finance system, as discussed by Hancock and Passmore (2011) and Scharfstein and 
Sunderam (2011), might be to retain some form of mortgage insurance in the public sector, but 
deeply subordinate taxpayer exposure by allowing only the assumption of catastrophic risk on 
qualified mortgages.  Our findings underscore the importance of efforts to develop appropriate 
mechanisms to assure the liquidity and stability of the housing finance system during periods of 
severe housing downturn.         
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Taken together, our findings offer a cautionary tale about portfolio geographic 
diversification as a mechanism to mitigate housing risk.  Indeed, during the late-2000s period of 
housing market boom and bust, local fundamentals became less important to MSA-specific returns. 
In such circumstances, investors and insurers of housing and mortgages must be able to withstand 
high levels of systemic risk.   
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 Figure 1 
Housing Return Integration Trends 
Average R-squares for US MSAs and California MSAs 
 
 
Notes: The level of integration is measured by the average R-squares from the multi-factor housing returns model fitted over a sequence 
of 30-quarter moving windows, 1992:Q2 – 2012:Q4 for 401 US MSAs and for 29 California MSAs. See Internet Appendix A, Tables A-2 and 
A-3 for details on the factors utilized in model estimation.   
 
 29 
 
Figure 2 
Contributions to MSA Housing Return Integration Trends 
1992:Q2 through 2012:Q4 
 
Panel A: Factor Contributions for 401 US MSAs 
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Panel B: Factor Contribution for 29 California MSAs 
 
Notes: The level of integration is measured by the R-square from a multi-factor housing returns model estimated for sequential 30-
quarter moving windows.  The R-square contribution of each factor to the level of integration is plotted.  Contributions of factors are 
identified by running a single-factor model and then incrementally adding additional factors and re-estimating the model.  The 
explanatory factors in their order of inclusion are average borrower loan-to-value ratio (LTV), private residential mortgage-backed 
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securities issuance (PRIVMBS), personal income (INCOME), equity market returns (S&P500), consumer sentiment (UMCSENT), PPI 
materials prices (PPITM),  single-family building permits (PERMIT1), payroll employment (PAYEMS), industrial production (INDPRO),and 
the Federal Funds rate (FEDFUNDS).  The incremental R-square is shown for each factor. For example, the plot labelled LTV shows the R-
square from a single factor LTV model; the plot labelled PRIVMBS shows the R-square from a two-factor model that includes both LTV and 
PRIVMBS, so the difference in R-square between these models portrays the increment to explanatory power associated with the PRIVMBS 
factor.  The final model, labelled FEDFUNDs, includes all 10 factors up to and including FEDFUNDs.      
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Figure 3 
Factor Economic Significance and Standard Error Bands 
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Notes: The economic impact of factors is illustrated using factor bootstrap betas and two sigma standard errors for all 401 US MSAs. The 
bootstrap – further details in the text - features 500 resamplings of both MSAs and quarters within each 30-quarter window.   The 
economic impact is presented for 1992:Q2 – 2012:Q4 for selected factors from the multi-factor housing returns model fitted using a 30-
quarter moving window.   Four of the most significant factors are depicted.  They are private residential mortgage-backed securities 
issuance (PRIVMBS), average borrower loan-to-value ratio (LTV), payroll employment (PAYEMS), and personal income (INCOME).  
Similar plots for other factors are available upon request. 
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Figure 4 
Housing Return Integration, Portfolio Risk and Diversification  
Panel A: Integration and Diversification for US MSAs  
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Panel B: Integration and Diversification for California MSAs  
 
 
Notes: Integration is measured by the R-squares from the multi-factor housing returns model fit for a sequence of 30-quarter moving 
windows.  Risk is measured by the standard deviation (volatility) of housing returns. Diversification is the average volatility of individual 
MSAs within an equal-weighted portfolio less the portfolio’s volatility.  The 30-quarter windows end on 1992:Q2 through 2012:Q4 for 401 
US MSAs (Panel A) and for 29 California MSAs (Panel B).   
  
Table 1 
Contemporaneous and Lagged MSA House Return Correlations 
by Geographic Cohort, 1985-2012 
 
  
  
Contemporaneous correlations Lagged/Leading (one quarter) correlations 
N 
Number 
Significant 
Percentage 
Significant 
Mean 
Correlation N 
Number 
Significant 
Percentage 
Significant 
Mean 
Correlation 
Pacific 276 118 42.754 0.437 576 168 29.167 0.355 
Mountain 630 197 31.270 0.412 1296 186 14.352 0.306 
West North 
Central 
528 41 7.765 0.272 1089 11 1.010 0.143 
West South 
Central 
946 56 5.920 0.220 1936 7 0.362 0.113 
East North 
Central 
1953 561 28.725 0.393 3969 205 5.165 0.236 
East South 
Central 
2850 601 21.088 0.377 5776 493 8.535 0.260 
South Atlantic 780 145 18.590 0.337 1600 117 7.312 0.226 
Middle 
Atlantic 
741 236 31.849 0.386 1521 240 15.779 0.273 
New England 136 107 78.676 0.689 289 191 66.090 0.552 
CA 406 398 98.030 0.770 841 785 93.341 0.669 
 
Notes: Return correlations are given for contemporaneous quarters and lagged by one quarter 
broken out by US Census Divisions.  N is the total number of pair-wise correlation coefficients; for 
example, there are 24 cities (MSAs) in the Pacific Division, so there are 24(23)/2 = 276 distinct 
contemporaneous correlations and 24(24) = 576 lagged correlations (since each member of a pair 
can either lead or lag.)  The number and proportion of significant correlations with a t-statistic 
greater than five and the mean correlation are reported.  The sample period is from 1985 to 2012 
inclusive. Some MSAs entered the data set after 1985 so that their correlations are computed with 
fewer than the maximum number of observations (112).  The t-statistics are based the number of 
observations available in each case.  Geographic regions conform to the nine US census divisions 
except that California is reported separately (CA).  US states in the nine census divisions are: Pacific 
(AK HI OR WA), Mountain (AZ CO ID MT NM NV UT WY), West North Central (IA KS MN MO ND NE 
SD), West South Central (AR LA OK TX), East North Central (IL IN MI OH WI), East South Central (AL 
KY MS TN), South Atlantic (DC DE FL GA MD NC SC VA WV), Middle Atlantic (NJ NY PA) and New 
England (CT MA ME NH RI VT).   
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  Table 2 
Housing Returns and Integration Measures, 1985-2012 
 
Statistic 
 Quarterly 
Return 
Sigma of 
Quarterly 
Return 
First R-
Square 
Last R-
Square 
Change 
in R-
Square 
(Last-
First) 
Trend t-
stat 
(Last-
First) 
R-
Square 
(2000) 
Change 
R-
Square 
(2000-
2012) 
Trend t-
stat (2000-
2012) 
Panel A.  All 401 U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
Mean 0.794 2.088 0.448 0.559 0.192 6.5486 0.398 0.173 7.0678 
Sigma 0.198 0.743 0.219 0.212 0.235 6.1572 0.193 0.220 5.8712 
Minimum 0.165 0.816 0.071 0.112 -0.390 -9.0282 0.089 -0.404 -9.7221 
Quintile 1 0.532 1.169 0.178 0.254 -0.154 -1.6046 0.173 -0.131 -1.3331 
Quintile 2 0.681 1.617 0.307 0.424 0.075 3.1482 0.268 0.043 4.1224 
Quintile 3 0.768 2.022 0.405 0.567 0.197 6.1259 0.361 0.165 7.1204 
Quintile 4 0.888 2.428 0.561 0.712 0.327 9.2816 0.481 0.296 10.0671 
Quintile 5 1.098 3.246 0.788 0.840 0.517 15.9634 0.707 0.490 15.6539 
Maximum 1.412 5.326 0.966 0.920 0.679 30.6598 0.925 0.662 32.3618 
Panel B.  29 California Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
Mean 0.920 3.051 0.631 0.819 0.200 5.042 0.668 0.151 4.588 
Sigma 0.272 0.490 0.160 0.081 0.141 4.686 0.237 0.211 4.987 
Minimum 0.486 2.404 0.320 0.629 -0.012 -1.026 0.162 -0.197 -2.931 
Maximum 1.417 4.454 0.843 0.917 0.453 14.787 0.925 0.573 13.924 
 
Notes: The columns contain different variables and the rows provide the summary statistic for each 
column variable.  Housing returns for each metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in the sample are the 
log quarterly differences in its FHFA repeat home sales price index.   Sigma is the standard 
deviation.  The R-Square from a multi-factor model is the measure of integration for an MSA.   The 
time trend t-statistics are estimated by regressing the R-squares for each MSA on a simple linear 
time trend for all available quarters of data and then averaging across MSAs.  Both the R-Square for 
the first 30-quarter estimation window and the R-Square for the start of 2000 are used to depict the 
trend in integration. The final average R-square is for 2012:Q4 and includes all 401 US MSAs in 
Panel A and 29 California MSAs in Panel B.  The change in R-squares (Last-First) refers to the 
average difference between estimates for 2012:Q4 and 1992:Q2.  The change in R-squares (2000-
2012) refers to the average difference between estimates for 2012:Q4 and 1999:Q4.  The cross-
sectional summary statistics include the mean, standard deviation, minimum, the mean values of 
quintile 1-5 (in Panel A), and the maximum for the variable in each column. 
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Table 3 
 
Correlations between Integration and Diversification  
for Different Periods 
 
Time Entire US California 
Full Sample -0.899 -0.862 
The 2000s -0.966 -0.836 
Boom -0.775 -0.738 
Bust and Aftermath -0.862 -0.758 
  
 
  
 
 
Notes: Correlations between integration and diversification are presented for the U.S. and California 
over four time periods.  Integration is measured by the average R-square from our multi-factor 
housing returns model fit to a sequence of 30-quarter moving windows.  Diversification is the 
average volatility of individual MSAs within an equal-weighted portfolio less the portfolio’s 
volatility.  The Full Sample has 30-quarter windows ending from 1992:Q2 to 2012:Q4.  The 2000's 
are from 2000:Q1 to 2012:Q4.  The Boom is from 2004:Q1 to 2007:Q4. The Bust and Aftermath is 
from 2008:Q1 to 2012:Q4.   
 
 
 
 
 
